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Introduction
Since its formation in 1994 Major League Soccer (MLS) has slowly been gaining the
momentum to reach a level of recognition similar to that of the top four sports leagues in the United
States – the National Football League, the National Basketball Association, the National Hockey
League, and Major League Baseball. Major League Soccer (MLS) is the top tier professional
soccer league in the United States, one of only two leagues to reach that status and the only soccer
league to sustain long term success.1 Made up of nineteen teams across the United States and
Canada, the MLS is structured much differently than the other leagues both within the United
States and internationally. It exists as a single entity model, meaning that the league manages the
individual franchises and the players of the MLS.

This unique structure has led to the

establishment of a comparatively low salary cap. This low salary cap has had a major influence
on the development of the MLS since its launch.
Talent and money have been two restricting factors on the growth of the MLS. With a
salary cap of $3.5 million the MLS has been limited to the players who are willing to accept salary
levels that keep the teams under the salary cap. 2 With no salary cap European, Asian and Latin
American clubs spend hundreds of millions on their players. These clubs are able to recruit high
level players from across the globe and create talented teams of superstars. Teams in the MLS
have not been able to attract the highest quality players from Europe or South America to the less
respected and lower paid US League or retain the talented players that develop within the United

1

The other being the North American Soccer League which operated in the United States and Canada from 1968 to
1984.
2

Table A in the Appendix includes the increases made to the salary cap in the years 2004-2014. $3.5 million is the
number for the 2014 season. This has increased incrementally over the past decade from around 2 million in 2004 to
its present value of 3.5 million. Specifically in 2007 when the Designated Player Rule was initiated the salary cap
was set at 2.1 million.
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States. Rather these highly valued players are lost to the professional leagues of Europe or South
America, and the MLS is continually composed of second (or lower) tier players.
In 2007 an adjustment was made to the salary restrictions, in order to make the MLS more
competitive on a global market. Teams were now allowed to pay a player beyond the salary cap.
A portion of their salary would be charged to the team total and any amount exceeding $400,000
would be paid by the club’s owner.3 Each franchise was allowed to add two of these players,
labeled “designated players (DPs)”, to their roster; provided they could find the outside funds to
do so. This new rule allowed MLS teams to acquire and retain higher-level local players and to
attract international players. The Los Angeles Galaxy was the first team to respond - signing
international icon David Beckham for the 2007-2010 seasons. More recent signings include
Steven Gerrard and Kaká, who have historically been beyond the financial reach of MLS clubs. 4
The Designated Player Rule has had a twofold effect. As clubs have grown they have had
the opportunity to invest in young talented players looking to make a name for themselves in the
international soccer community. However, the majority of the players recruited under this rule are
seasoned soccer players who have established careers in the sport and have played a number of
years in other international leagues. This study will focus on this latter group of players, those
who are brought into the MLS and are already well known, with the hope that they will further the
success of the team and league. Success is a complicated concept to define, and in the case of

3

Table A in the Appendix tracks the structure of the Designated Player Rule from its initiation in 2007 through
2014.
Steven Gerrard is a top level British soccer player, playing for both England’s national team and for Liverpool, an
English Premiere League Team, from 1998 to 2015. In 2015, at age 35, Gerrard signed an 18 month $9 million
dollar contract with the LA Galaxy as a designated player. Ricardo Kaká is a professional Brazilian soccer player
who has spent his career playing for top level teams Milan and Real Madrid. In 2014 at age 32, he signed a
Designated Player contracted to play with Orlando City FC when it was established in 2015.
4
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Major League Soccer and these big name players it is ambiguous whether success is defined on
the field or at the box office.
My research will study the “marquee effect” of designated players within Major League
Soccer. I am defining the marquee effect as whether these players have a greater impact on team
performance or on team revenue: the “performance effect” versus the “revenue effect”. In many
cases designated players are past their prime playing years. Beckham came to the Galaxy in 2007
at the age of 32 with an ankle injury that was slow to heal and significantly limited his playing
time. While the players are no doubt talented, there is a question of whether they truly make a
difference in the performance of their team. Most professional soccer players peak in their midtwenties and retire before they reach the age of 30. Joining a new club at the age of 32 is not a
traditional career path. Despite extraordinary skill, players start to lose value on the field as
younger competitors become available and exploit the weaknesses that come with age.
However, as players grow in popularity their marketing value can increase. People spend
money to buy merchandise with the player’s name on it.

These players could draw greater

attendance at games, expanding the market beyond avid soccer fans, to those who want to watch
the big name player take the field. This “star factor” is enticing to clubs and the potential for
revenue growth from these players may justify recruiting them, despite the large salary.
Performance and revenue are two major considerations of professional sports teams, and
traditionally the two are interconnected. For Major League Soccer, which has struggled in gaining
a foothold of popularity in the United States, both are important long term goals. In order to stay
relevant, improving the level of competition is necessary so that the MLS can compete with the
more popular established sports leagues. Simultaneously the teams are a business with executives,
employees, and financial objectives of maximizing profit. Without revenue growth the franchises
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and the league cannot continue to operate. Designated players are attractive because of their crowd
appeal and consequently the money they have the potential to bring into the club.
The question this paper attempts to address is what is the ultimate objective of these teams?
Do clubs sign their designated players with the ultimate goal of improving the team’s performance,
improving the team’s bottom line because of a big name player on the roster, or do designated
players help teams achieve both the athletic goal of winning and the business goal of increasing
profit?
I will examine the performance records and attendance totals of the MLS teams from 2004
to 2014 in order to study the overall effects of the designated players within the league.5 I will use
the points earned by each team over the regular MLS season as the measure of performance. 6 I
will also use average attendance over the season for each team in order to find a preliminary
relationship between a team’s designated players and that team’s overall average attendance.
Revenue will be estimated in an additional equation where attendance and designated players will
be used as an independent variable.7 With an analysis of the data a relationship between attendance
and revenue can be established and allows me to indirectly estimate the influences that DPs have
on seasonal revenue.
Based on the literature and personal knowledge of the sport, I believe there will be a large
effect of DPs on MLS team revenue. Similar to the findings of Jane (2014) in the case study of

5

Because of their business structure Major League Soccer franchises are not required to publish revenue data. This
lack of data complicates a direct study of the relationship between designated players and team revenue. In order to
develop an equation to estimate revenue, I will be performing the secondary regression to discover the relationship
between attendance and revenue using data collected and published by Forbes in 2008, 2013, and 2015.
6

Using each team’s MLS regular season record – three points awarded for a win, one for a tie, and none for a loss.
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Due to the characteristics of the MLS as a smaller league within the United States, ticket sales make up a large share
of revenue. Thus attendance can be used as the major factor contributing to total revenue. It can also be considered
that the share of attendance revenue in total revenue is relatively proportional across the different clubs allowing for
a single equation to estimate total revenue in the years where data is not provided.
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NBA teams, players who are popular increase demand more than players who perform well; that
is fans are enticed to attend a game more by the chance to see an iconic player than to see a team
perform well. Thus the coefficient on designated players in relation to attendance will be large
and significant.
Much of the literature studied introduces the idea that the presence of DPs on a team may
decrease team performance. It is a logical extension that team performance will not suffer and
improve as a result of DPs because of the skill they offer, but the overall effect on team
performance will be small. Support of this hypothesis would show a coefficient that while positive
will not be statistically significant as a variable.

Literature Review
Studies of marquee players and the relationship to performance and/or revenue is a topic
that has been heavily discussed in the field of sports economics. Sports teams/leagues function
differently from the traditional business model, in that they are not pure profit maximizers –
“playing success is the objective of all the relevant participants in the club – directors, shareholders,
managers and supporters’ clubs. However, divergent interests and, therefore, conflict may arise
over financial constraints.”8 With the limited amount of money available to a team and the high
salary cost of holding such a player, the pros and cons of marquee players is constantly under
debate. A team’s roster is one of the few things it can control when going into competition; thus
it is important to understand the effects of roster restrictions on team objectives.
The question of what contributes to a soccer team’s objective function is addressed in the
works of Sloane (1971), and Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2007). Each established that utility is a

8

“The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as a Utility Maximiser,” Peter Sloane, pg. 135

7

function of both athletic success and financial stability. Sloane analyzes the English Football
League studying the presence of economic activity of the league as well as the organizational
characteristics. Sloane addresses the presence of star players and the paradoxical cycle of purchase
of these high level players and balance of maintaining a competitive league. He finds that the
traditional profit goal of a business enterprise “exerts a smaller influence on behaviour” (p. 145)
as team utility is not solely based on maximizing profits but also playing success, average
attendance, the health of the league, recorded profits, minimum after tax profits, and taxes. Garciadel-Barrio and Pujol focus their research on Spanish Soccer Players and the professional leagues
in Spain. They create a model which estimates what number of players with superstar abilities
will be hired in order to maximize superstar inputs. This allows them to then study the relationship
of monopsony rents within the league and the superstar players who benefit from this characteristic
of the league. Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol define utility as related to the potential playing success
of a team which is a function of the amount of talent hired, the proportion of average skill on the
team, and a binary variable which accounts for individual team characteristics. Using variables
representative of the salaries, revenue-generating capabilities, superstar capabilities, and
individual characteristics of each player in the Spanish professional soccer league for the season
2001/2002 the authors concluded there are two labor markets in professional soccer – a market for
super stars and another for ordinary players. Their analysis goes further to indicate the existence
of monopsony rents which are paid out by the ordinary players and used to reward the superstars.
This explains the limited profits of the soccer teams as the superstar players, not the teams, are the
ones who benefit from the monopsony rents generated by the organization of the league.
In the current literature there are two major branches of the analysis of “marquee” players
– studies focusing on the effects of player salaries on performance and those that focus on the
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effects of marquee players on attendance. Some research also expands upon this to consider the
relationship between high-performing players and game attendance. Much of this research focuses
on the costs and benefits of star athletes. All sports leagues contain iconic players and top-level
performers. And with the data and information that is easily available today, the impact these
athletes have on games and on the league can be measured.
Part of being a designated player in the MLS is the high salary that comes with this status,
and DPs are paid well beyond what the majority of the team makes. Kuethe and Motamed (2010)
study the wage determination of players within Major League Soccer. Specifically focusing on
how the presence of players of “superstar status” affects the wages of the players across the entire
roster. Kuethe and Motamed discovered that while salary is a function of individual performance,
experience and reputation, being a designated player “yields a 928% wage premium” (pg. 575)
over the average player. Studies have shown that this disparity among player salaries can lead to
reduced team performance. Frey et al. (2013) observe this pay-performance relationship in a study
focusing on players in the NBA and the German Bundesliga. The authors measured both the pay
and performance of the athletes in these two leagues, concentrating on the relative income level of
the players in relation to the rest of their team. It was determined through their research that
personal performance is directly and negatively related to relative salary level. 9 Soccer is a team
sport and a poor performance by a single individual directly influences the performance of the
team as whole. Understanding that relative pay can adversely affect team performance is valuable
if the purpose of a team is to maximize success. Sonntag and Sommers (2014) and Coates et al.
(2014) each find that unequal salary distribution affects team performance in Major League
Soccer. In the former, Sonntag and Sommers observed the effects of the designated player rule on

9

The Bundesliga is the top tier German Soccer League.
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the probability of a team winning over the 2011 and 2012 season. By computing a GINI coefficient
representative of salary inequality on the team, the authors observed that increased inequality leads
to decreased probability of winning. The latter study, Coates et al., observes points as a function
of the total wage bill, the wage bill distribution, and goals scored per game over the season in the
MLS. With the purpose of studying the relationship between production and the salary structure
of the team with a special focus on superstars in the MLS, Coates et al. observed that the size of
the wage bill and the wage inequality of a team oppositely affect the success of a team, with the
final effect dependent on the size of the franchise. Each of these studies observe that when the
distribution of team salaries becomes more unequal the performance of the team suffers. The
presence of a single designated player significantly increases the wage disparity between players
on an MLS team; and most teams have more than one player of this designation on their roster
creating an even more unequal spread of salary amongst the team.
The other half of the literature is addressed in research by Jewell (2015), Lawson et al.
(2008), and Jane (2014). Each of these authors examines the effect of star players on attendance.
Attendance is one of the key indicators of revenue for a sports team, ticket sales make up a large
portion of the money that a team makes over the course of a season. Jewell (2015) was able to
measure the cumulative effect of designated players on attendance by studying attendance records
in the MLS from 2007 to 2012. Jewell considered both home and away attendance in order to
observe the full effect of each designated player on game attendance. He determined that having
designated players increases game attendance, but with diminishing returns as the novelty of their
presence wears off. Lawson et al. (2008) similarly approached the topic by focusing solely on
David Beckham and the effect that he had on the 2007 season in sales and attendance across the
entirety of the MLS.

They found that Beckham’s presence positively affected both. Beckham’s
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presence within the MLS increased both sales and attendance when the MLS was considered as a
whole. They also looked at Beckham’s contribution to his team, the LA Galaxy. Lawson et al.
were able to determine that the increased profits that Beckham brought in covered six times the
$400,000 reserved for him out of the salary cap. This presents an interesting perspective as one
must simultaneously consider the impact Beckham had on the league as well as his team. It is
possible that the final results of the “Beckham Experiment” would not equally (or even positively)
affect both the MLS and LA Galaxy. Jane (2014) investigated attendance in the NBA surrounding
the presence of both high performing athletes and those considered the most popular. Similar to
the work of Jewell, Jane concluded that star players did increase attendance, with the demand being
driven by the popular players rather than the high performing athletes.
Counter to the results of these studies, authors Berri et al. (2004) determined that in the
NBA people were drawn to competitions because of the desire to see a good game rather than the
presence of a star player. Through their study of gate revenue at NBA games, Berri et al. rejected
the idea that star players are the driving force of revenue in the NBA.
My research advances the literature because it simultaneously studies both performance
and revenue in Major League Soccer. Previously the literature has often limited itself to one of
the two topics - performance or revenue. By looking at the results side by side from the same
data I can examine the effects simultaneously in both outcomes. I also consider designated
players and the subsequent data in the MLS into 2014. This is significant because 2013 was the
first year in which each team in the MLS had at least one designated player on its roster.
Including these more recent years allows the study to reach across each of the MLS teams and
reflects the effects of designated players on each of the distinctive teams. By defining all players
ever labeled as a designated player as marquee players I expand the sample of star players used
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in previous literature. Additionally, when studying designated players in the MLS, few authors
have used the entire list of players; rather they have limited the group of players they study
(Lawson et al. (2008); Jewell (2015)). Having a greater number of observations will allow for
more precise results measuring the effect of designated players as a whole rather than a selective
group. The players that Jewell (2015) considers include solely the most recognizable players and
Lawson et al. (2008) only study the influence of Beckham. The group of designated players as a
whole includes many other players who exhibit different characteristics than those previously
studied. The designated player rule has now been in effect for eight seasons, it has adapted and
evolved over this time period. These changes have created a different culture of designated
players than those inaugural players in 2007. This would allow for the effects of all designated
players considered to be different than the impact of solely the most notable names.

Theoretical Model
In most for profit contexts, profit maximization is the assumed firm objective. Sports
franchises, however, often have connecting objectives of profit maximization and on field success.
Without success in both of these categories the club will be disbanded because of the inability to
pay for players or lack of competitive contribution to the league. Major League Soccer clubs face
these goals simultaneously and thus the objective function of the franchise is not only a function
of profit, but also is affected by performance and other athletic characteristics.
Peter Sloane addressed the utility of the club in his study of the English Football League
in 1971. Sloane introduces the concept of soccer clubs as utility maximizers rather than solely
profit maximizers. The presence of management individuals that are focused on performance and
monetary success leads teams to decisions that address both of these categories. Both good results
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and high attendance are needed in order for a program to continue (or establish) success. Sloane
adapts O. E. Williamson’s (1963) utility maximization model to represent the function of a soccer
club: 10
𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑃, 𝐴, 𝑋, 𝜋𝑅 − 𝜋0 − 𝑇)
subject to 𝜋𝑅 ≥ 𝜋0 + 𝑇
where P = playing success
A = average attendance
X = health of the league
𝜋𝑅 = recorded profits
𝜋0 = minimum after-tax profits
T = taxes

(1)

Considering playing success and average attendance, in addition to profits when constructing the
utility function yields different predictions that than of profit maximization. Utility maximization
of this model suggests why clubs focus on maximizing their playing success while also addressing
club profits.
Sloane’s utility function can be expanded using the research produced by Pedro Garciadel-Barrio and Francesc Pujol in their study of the Spanish professional soccer league. They also
address the idea that a team’s utility is not solely focused on profit maximization but is rather based
around playing success:

(2)

∑ 𝐴∗𝑖

𝑈𝑛 = 𝑈 (

𝑁

, 𝑆𝑛 , 𝜑𝑛 )

where

10

∀ 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁

∑ 𝐴∗𝑖

= the proportion of all kinds of ordinary skills
that corresponds to each team
𝑆𝑛 = the amount of superstar talent hired
𝜑𝑛 = team characteristics and peculiarities
n = number of teams
𝑁

Williamson, O. E. (1963). Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior. American Economic Review, Vol. 53,
1963.
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In this model the playing success and ultimately the utility of a team is based upon the superstar
talent it is able to afford, as well as how much ordinary skill they have in relation to other teams.
Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol assume that there is a positive relationship between superstar inputs
and the utility. This leads to the idea that equation (2) can be maximized by increasing the number
of super star players the team is able to hire ( 𝑆𝑛 ). But it must also be considered that teams want
to avoid running any long term financial deficit. From this assumption Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol
adjust their optimization model in order to address profits. The following constraint on utility
maximization acknowledges this secondary focus of the team:

(3)

𝑆

∏𝑛 = 𝛼𝑛 ( 𝑛∗ , 𝜑𝑛 ) ∙ ∏𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝐸𝑛 (𝑓(𝑆𝑛 ), 𝑚(𝑆𝑛 ), 𝜑𝑛 ) − (𝑤𝑠 𝑓 ∙ 𝑆𝑛 + 𝑤𝑠 𝑚 ∙ 𝑆𝑛 ) ≥ 0
𝑆
where 𝑆𝑛 , 𝜑𝑛 , 𝑛 = the same as above
𝛼𝑛 (∙) = proportion of earnings that correspond to each team
𝑆𝑛
= the special talents hired by the team with respect to the total
𝑆∗
special abilities in the league
𝐸𝑛 (∙) = additional source of revenue
∏𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑑 = total revenues generated by the whole league
𝑤𝑠 𝑓 = rewards of player performance contribution for superstar
players
𝑚
𝑤𝑠 = payments associated to merchandizing activities for superstar
players

Within equation (3) 𝜑𝑛 is considered exogenous and the assumption is made that all extra profits
are spent on superstar talent. The first element of equation (4) estimates the portion of the profits
achieved by the industry as a whole that corresponds to each particular team. The second element
measures the level of revenues that can be attributed to attendance and the level of support that
each team draws from its fans, values dependent on individual team characteristics. It is obvious
from the work of Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol that a team’s utility function is based on performance
and maximized subject to the revenues of the team.
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Each of the two utility models addresses the presence of both performance and revenue as
a contributor to maximizing utility and thus a focus for a team. A simpler model can be developed
from the previously discussed models. An additively separable objective function takes into
consideration both profits and performance as contributors to a team’s utility, while
acknowledging the limiting nature of the salary cap that is imposed on MLS teams.
(4)

𝑈 = 𝛼 ∏ + 𝛽𝑃
subject to the salary cap
where ∏ = Revenue – Cost
P = Points

Creating an additively separable model allows for teams to address profits and performance
separately. While it might be possible for teams to maximize their objective function in this
manner, from Sloane it can be seen that doing so could lead to the termination of a program because
of the limited success in the other category. Additional the salary cap is a function of the marginal
factor costs of each player (their salaries), where for each designated player only $400,000 of their
salary is counted into this amount.
(5)

𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑀𝐹𝐶𝑖 − (𝑀𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑃 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝑃 )
where 𝑀𝐹𝐶𝑖 = the marginal factor cost of player i
𝑀𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑃 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝑃 = the portion of the DP’s salary counted
into the salary cap
n = the number of players on the team’s roster

This equation addresses the relationship of the individual costs of each player and how as a whole
each marginal factor cost as well as the price of a designated player plays into the salary cap which
acts as a restriction on the team’s utility.
From a profit side of the objective function (equation (4)) a team will sign a player so long
as the marginal revenue product of that player is greater or equal to the marginal factor cost, or
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salary, of that player. We consider two relationships that lead to increased revenues; an increase
in points which leads to increased attendance which then increases revenue and the direct
relationship between increased attendance and greater revenue. The influence of designated
players on performance and attendance are important because of the implications. These players
cost a great deal to the teams that sign them, if their marginal revenue product is not greater than
the marginal factor cost to the team, then the team’s profit will decline.
The other component of the objective function addresses the performance of a team.
Players contribute to a team in different amounts, a factor which could be considered their
marginal points. This contribution must be weighed against the cost of that player. A team then
signs players with the highest marginal points subject to this salary constraint. This again
addresses the cost of a designated player. If these players are not contributing to performance
enough to balance their high cost, then utility will suffer rather than increase when these players
are signed to the team.

Econometric Models and Methods
The models for performance and attendance express the dependent variables as functions
of each team’s wage bill, the GINI coefficient for the team salaries, and the number of designated
players on a team.11 Performance and attendance will also be affected by the characteristics of the
season (year) and the team. The performance of the team in the current year as well as the previous
year will be considered as an additional contributor to attendance. There will also be a binary
variable included to indicate whether it is the inaugural season of a team as this will be a factor
that contributes to performance. Two Ordinary Least Squared Regressions will be performed to

11

A GINI coefficient is an economic measure of inequality. It is the area between the linear function of equal salary
and the true salary values of the team. The greater the inequality the larger the GINI coefficient will be.
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determine the coefficients of the two equations. This will test the proposed relationship between
the independent variables and the dependent variables of performance and attendance. The
estimated regressions of the points and attendance of each team will be based on the following
forms:
(6)

(7)

𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4 𝐹𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(+)
(?)
(+)
(-)
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4 𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5 𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(+)
(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)

Where Ptsit represents the points of team i in year t, Attit represents the average attendance of team
i in year t, WBit represents the wage bill of team i in year t, GINIit represents the GINI inequality
coefficient of the player salaries of team i in year t, DPit is the number of designated players on
team i in year t, FYit is a binary indicating if it is the first year the team is playing, 𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 exists
as a lag variable for the performance of team i in the previous year (t-1), 𝜃𝑖 exists to carry the fixed
effects of team i, 𝛾𝑡 carries the time effects of year t, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.
Over the course of a season a team claims points based on the final result of each game
they play; that is three points for a win, one for a tie, and zero for a loss. The total number of
points across the season will be used as the measure of performance. The other dependent variable
will be attendance. Attendance will be collected as a seasonal average of the total game attendance
for each team from the posted match reports following each game.
The wage bill for each team will be measured as the total of the guaranteed compensation
values for each player. Guaranteed compensation values for the year are used rather than the
player’s base salary because the total compensation often exceeds the base salary values. The total
guaranteed compensation salaries are more representative of the total amount the teams are
responsible to pay out. Using these values also leads to a GINI coefficient that is a better
17

illustration of the true inequality in player-to-player salary as some players receive generous
additional compensation while others receive very little, if anything. One would assume that more
money spent on salaries would indicate a better team with better players (all around not solely
DPs). Therefore, in the points regression it is expected that the wage bill would produce a positive
coefficient. One would expect to see similar results in the attendance equation for the same reasons
as points.
It is important to consider the effect of inequality in wages of the team salaries as there is
evidence relating performance and salary distribution. The GINI coefficient for each team’s player
salaries will be used to represent this. The standard deviation of the salary was also considered as
a factor rather than the GINI coefficient to represent the inequality of wages. However, the
correlation between the salary standard deviation and the other variables was considered too
significant to include that factor.12 Despite this high correlation the standard deviation of player
salaries was included in some of the equations in place of the GINI coefficient so that the
relationship between this measure and points and attendance could be observed. Much of this
literature finds that increased salary dispersion leads to poorer team performance. 13 If this is the
case, it might be that as teams pick up designated players they end up hurting the performance of
the club. Using this information it is difficult to determine the sign of the coefficient on the GINI
variable in either regression.
The final common factor between the two equations is the number of designated players
on the roster. The sign, significance and magnitude of these coefficients is the focus of the

12

Table B in the Appendix includes the correlations between the wage bill, number of designated players, wage
GINI and salary standard deviation variables.
13

Sonntag and Sommers (2014) and Coates et al. (2014)
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hypothesis. Excluding the years 2004, 2005, and 2006 when the rule was not in effect, the number
of designated players per team ranges between zero and three.14 As stated earlier there would
potentially be a positive coefficient but not a statistically significant effect of the number of DPs
on a team’s record and points. Yet, due to the popularity of most designated players and the draw
of seeing them in person there should be a positive and significant coefficient of DPs on
attendance.
The attendance equation also considers the performance of the team in the previous season.
Teams will likely gain fans following a year of success or lose fans if they produce a poor
performance.

The effect of a team’s historical performance will be measured by this lag

performance variable. This will most likely result in a positive and statistically significant
coefficient on the lag points variable as well as the points variable as successful teams draw bigger
crowds to their games.
Considering whether this is the first year a team is playing is also important. New teams
rarely produce a successful first season as they work to build their team and their franchise. The
effects of being a first year team can only be considered in the points regression because the lag
variable in the attendance equation eliminates all first year teams from the sample. The coefficient
on the binary will be negative and significant because a team will produce fewer points in their
first season.
It is necessary to include team and year binary variables in the model because of the unique
characteristics of each team and season. The team binary variable controls for differences in city
demographics that can contribute to the success of a team in building a fan base. 15 The year

14

Table C in the Appendix Lists the number of Designated Players on each team for each year from 2007 to 2014.
Contributing differences between cities to MLS teams would be the make-up of the population, economic stature
of the city, other professional sports teams that exist in the area, and existing soccer youth development programs.
15
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dummy variable will cover the characteristics of the league that change year to year as well as
outside factors.16, 17
From the estimated coefficients (Bi and δi) both the statistical significance and the
economic significance of each of the variables will be observed.

It must be taken into

consideration that there is a possibility that the overall effect of a variable, though statistically
significant, does not have enough economic weight to be observed as a contributing factor in the
study.
Following the completion of the previous regression and study of the generated coefficients
and information the significance of the relationship between attendance and team revenue will be
tested. For three years Forbes Online has estimated MLS team revenues based on their own
research. These years include the 2007, 2012, and 2014 MLS seasons and values for each of the
teams active in that year. Using these data, as well as the attendance data an equation will be
estimated to represent this relationship.18 This will require another use of an OLS regression. This
equation will be applied to the remainder of the attendance data in order to estimate the effect of
the designated players on revenue.
(8)

𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(+)
(+)

In Equation (8) Revit represents the total revenue of team i in year t, and Attit, 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝜃𝑖 , 𝛾𝑡 , and 𝜀𝑖𝑡
represent the same elements as in the earlier equations. From this equation the relationship

16

For example from 2004 to 2014 the league has changed the number of games played in a season.

17

Outside contributors could include whether the MLS season coincides with a World Cup tournament year. In a
season where the World Cup takes place teams that have international teams players on their roster will lose them to
preliminary international matches and have to give them a rest period following the tournament before they return to
MLS play. Players that play on their national teams are often also under Designated Player status.
18

Forbes Revenue Data Summary Statistics contained in Table D in the Appendix.
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between attendance and revenue and indirectly the relationship between designated players and
team revenue can be identified. It is expected that the effect of attendance on revenue will be
positive because the more people that attend an event the greater the revenue from that event will
be. It would also be expected that the number of designated players a team has would also
positively affect revenue because the reputation and popularity of these players allows them to
bring in money for the team outside of game attendance.
There are a number of potential additional influences that DPs can have that are not being
considered in this research. The variables chosen provide a lower bound estimate of the effect of
designated players. No positive future outcomes from signing these big name players are being
considered. By limiting the study to the factors that are more directly related to designated players
only the most conservative effects are displayed. Due to this limitation there is potential for other
gains for clubs and Major League Soccer as a whole that are not addressed in this paper. For
example these may include increased merchandise sales that contribute to revenue.19 The exposure
teams receive nationally may increase the MLS fan base leading to greater sales in the future as
well as demand for higher performing U.S. players. The global recognition gained from signing
big name international players could help a team recruit better players in the future.
These are interesting topics to pursue but they exist outside the scope of the objective for
this research. The focus of this research is to study whether the ultimate goal of these franchises
in signing designated players is that of a winning sports team, or that of a profit making business.
In order to observe the significance of these players the study’s model must be simple and
straightforward.

19

As earlier mentioned, Major League Soccer is not a large league and much of their revenue is derived from ticket
sales. This reason, along with the lack of revenue data, is why I am not including merchandise sales in my research.
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These regressions test the value of the marquee player. The effect of the presence of DP
players on performance and on revenue can be observed and measured. From this research on
MLS teams it can be predicted whether they hire designated players in order to improve team
performance or if the ultimate goal is to increase team revenue.

Data
I have collected panel data covering the individual variables for each team active in the
years from 2004 to 2014. This information was obtained from the MLS league website as well as
the respective team websites.20 The MLS expanded from ten teams to nineteen over the period
from 2004 to 2014. Table E lists the teams in the sample and the years in which they are active.
All nineteen teams were not formed until the 2012 season.21
Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table F.22 Due to the nature of the data
each statistic is organized in a panel format. In total there are 167 observations over the eleven
year period. In order to simplify the summary I have taken the panel as a whole in calculating the
following values rather than measuring across a year or a team.
Each of these values comes from team data from the end of the season. This is after all
trades have been made and rosters are finalized for the championship tournament at the end of the
season. In the summary statistics total guaranteed compensation and attendance are measured at
their whole value, in the regressions they are adjusted to units of 1000 so that the regression results
would produce more manageable values. Revenue is also measured per million dollars for each
team.

20
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www.mlssoccer.org or www.mlsplayer.org
Table E is presented in the Appendix
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Table F is presented in the Appendix
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The number of designated players for each team lies between 0 and 3. The first year that
each team had a designated player was 2013, during the 2014 season each team also had at least
one designated player. LA Galaxy and the New York Red Bulls are the only two teams to roster
at least one designated player each year following the creation of the Designated Player Rule.
Montreal Impact and the Portland Timbers each had a designated player every year following their
founding years, 2012 and 2011 respectively. There is an average of 27 players on each roster over
the eleven seasons from 2004 to 2014. Additionally there was an increase of $2.5 million, from
$1.9 million to $4.3 million, on average spent in salaries from the time period before the
Designated Player Rule was implemented (2004-2006) and in the years following (2007-2014).

Results
These models were estimated using three fixed effects regressions, one each with points,
attendance, and revenue as the dependent variable. Table G, Table H and Table I report the results
of the regressions.23 The results for the binary variables representing the years and the individual
teams were not included in the results table in order to highlight the important variables under
consideration.
The first variable placed under consideration was performance using the points
accumulated over the season as the dependent variable. Multiple regressions were performed
using a combination of the total number of designated players, total guaranteed player salaries, the
GINI coefficient on player salaries, the team standard deviation on salaries, the founding year
binary, as well as time effects and fixed effects for the individual teams.

23

Table G, Table H, and Table I are available in the Appendix
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Under these regressions, total guaranteed player salary and founding year proved to be
significant variables each time at the 99% level. These were the only two variables that proved to
be consistently significant regardless of the other variables included in the regression. This
indicates that for every additional $100,000 a team spends on their wage bill a team can be
expected to improve their season results by two points (or 1 point under the second regression).
The coefficient on founding year indicates that a first year team would produce on average 11
fewer points than a veteran team, a result that would be expected giving the new team has no
experience in the league.
In the case of each regression the coefficient on the number of designated players is
negative and in every case the coefficient is insignificant. Across each of the regressions the results
produced are consistent regardless of changes in the variable also included in the estimation. This
indicates designated players have an adverse, albeit insignificant, effect on team performance.
The R square value for these regressions all lie between 0.315 and 0.383. It can be
understood that the variables included in this regression only explain about 35% of the variation
in points. Thus there must be a number of other factors that determine the success of a team that
have not been considered in this regression. This could be as simple as team chemistry or the
strength of their schedule to the more complicated influences such as player injuries or coaching
dynamic, these variable would be much more difficult to capture and measure as contributors to
team performance.
The second regression considers the relationship between designated players and
attendance. Multiple regressions were performed using total number of point, the points of the
previous season, total guaranteed player salaries, the GINI coefficient on player salaries, team
standard deviation of salaries, as well as time effects and the team fixed effects.
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Across the four regressions the coefficients on the total number of points for the season
and the previous season’s points were consistent, at the 99% level and 95% level respectively
(excluding the fourth regression where the previous season was only significant at the 90% level
under a one-tailed test). The coefficient on points of on average 0.077 indicates that each
additional point gained in a season would increase average attendance by around 77 people. An
additional point in the previous year would increase attendance by around 40 people. Similarly,
the coefficient on GINI wage coefficient, shows that a 0.1 increase in wage inequality increases
attendance by 835 people and is also significant at the 99% level in the fourth regression. Team
standard deviation on salaries is included in the third regression and significant at the 99% level.
The coefficient of 0.004 means that an increase of one standard deviation would increase
attendance by 400 people. Total guaranteed player salaries was not consistently significant across
the regressions but in the cases where the coefficients are significant they are negative, indicating
that an increase in total guaranteed salaries causes attendance to decrease.
In the case of designated players the coefficient on the variable is both negative and
significant when wage inequality is also considered as a contributing factor (regressions three and
four). In each of the final two regressions the coefficients are significant at the 90% and 95%
levels and contrary to what was expected the data shows that the presence of one additional
designated player would decrease attendance by 381 and 569 people, respectively. This could be
because the diminishing returns of a designated player playing for multiple years was not
considered, an idea introduced by Jewell in his 2015 study of MLS attendance and designated
players.24

24

Jewell, R. Todd. 2015. “The Effects of Marquee Players on Sports Demand: The Case of U.S. Major League
Soccer.” Journal of Sports Economics 1–14.
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This regression produces as R square values that ranged between 0.893 and 0.903. In the
final regression which was most representative of the relationship of the considered variables it
can be understood that 90.3% of the variation in attendance can be explained by changes in the
included independent variables. This would indicate that performance (points) is a significant
contributor to game attendance. The exceptionally high R2 value can also be attributed to the team
fixed effects and year effects which, in many cases, are also significant contributors to team
attendance records. Understanding the significance of points on attendance is important for future
analysis because of the insignificant effect that designated players have on points and performance
as seen in the results above.
The final regression studies the effect of attendance on revenue. Using the average season
attendance (adjusted to per 1000 people) and the revenue data published by Forbes it was
determined that the coefficient on attendance was positive and significant at the 99% level. Each
additional thousand attendees increased a team’s revenue by $970,000. This regression also ended
up with an R square value of 0.955 signifying a very positive relationship between changes in
attendance and those in revenue, as well as the fixed team effects and year effects.
An additional regression was run including the number of designated players as a
contributing variable to revenue. This was performed to study the affect that designated players
have on revenue separate from their influence on attendance. Under this estimation average
attendance was still significant at the 99% level. The number of designated players were
significant at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test. The coefficient of 0.992
indicates that an additional designated player will increase revenue by $992,000, all other factors
held constant. This is a significant increase in revenue per player, especially when considering the
limited influence that designated players have on attendance and points. These influences could
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come through in categories such as merchandise purchases by fans or potentially sponsorships that
are created by the presence of designated players on a team’s roster.
The focus of this paper is the relationship between designated players and performance and
revenue. From the regression results it seems as though the relationship initially hypothesized is
incorrect.

Designated players seem to negatively affect both points and attendance.

The

implications of these results must then be addressed while considering the objective function
(equation (4)) that was presented earlier. The theoretical model addresses the marginal factor cost
of the designated players as well as their marginal points and marginal revenue product. The
negative and insignificant coefficient on the number of designated players in the first set of
regressions indicates that designated players have little to no effect on a team’s performance. This
would equate their marginal points to that of an average player on the team. This weighed against
the high cost of the player does not justify the signing of that player to the team’s roster.
Additionally the positive effect of points on attendance and negative effect of designated players
on attendance, where attendance has a significant and positive effect on revenue addresses the idea
that designated player do not effect revenue through either of these categories. Rather the marginal
revenue product of designated players is solely influenced by what seems to be external elements.
It must then be addressed whether these designated players have a marginal revenue product high
enough to offset the marginal factor cost.
An estimation of a designated player’s marginal revenue product can be made using the
results of the regressions. The third regression introduces the idea that designated players increase
revenue by $992,000 through external factors. This can be weighed against their effects on
performance and attendance using the following equation.
(9) 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑃 = 992,000 + (−569 ∗ 1005) + (−1.688 ∗ 80 ∗ 1005) + (−1.688 ∗ 31 ∗ 1005)
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The first portion of equation (9) comes from the effect of designated players on revenue. The
second part comes from the effect of designated players on attendance and the subsequent effect
of attendance on revenue. The third and fourth measure the influence of designated players on
points, the effect of points and lag points on attendance respectively, and finally the effect of
attendance on revenue. This calculation takes into consideration all the different avenues through
which designated players affect the final revenue of a team. The final value of equation (9) comes
out to only $231,850. This is a total well below the average designated player salary of $1,802,343,
the average marginal factor cost of these players. The model objective function introduced earlier
in this paper presents the condition that franchises only sign designated players if their marginal
revenue product is greater than or equal to their marginal factor cost. Equation (9) shows that this
is not the case for designated players in the MLS today. These players are being paid beyond the
additional revenue that they are bringing into the teams that they play for. The costs of these
players far outweigh the benefits that they bring to their franchise.

Robustness
The relationship between designated players and performance/attendance/revenue was
further examined through three alternative methods of measuring the presence of designated
players25. Performing these additional regressions would allow greater consideration for the
unique values of the designated players rather than considering each player identical.

By

addressing interactive effects as well between designated players and the teams they play for the
differences that the presence of these players have for their individual teams can be observed rather
than relying solely on the fixed team effects to capture these differences.
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The Summary Statistics for the variables used in this further study are presented in Table J.
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The first addressed measuring designated players as a total amount of salary spent on these
players rather than the number of designated players on the roster. This is valuable consideration
because there are some designated players who are being paid only just beyond the $400,000
allotted to the salary cap and there are some who are paid five or six times this amount. This is a
wide range of designate player salaries which also might reflect the skill and/or “star” quality of
the players the teams are signing. By measuring the total amount being invested in these players
rather than solely their presence, the relative value in comparison to their cost can be taken into
further consideration.
Two sets of fixed effects regressions were performed for each performance and attendance
– the first just adding the summation of the designated player salaries and the second using this
variable to replace the variable accounting for the number of designated players on each team’s
roster.26 In each of the regression where performance was the dependent variable the results were
consistent with those produced previously. The founding year binary variable and the total
guaranteed player salaries remained statistically significant across each of the regressions, and the
number of designated players on a team remained generally insignificant when it was included in
the regression. There was only one case where the wage bill of the designated players was
significant and this was when there were not measures of salary or inequality included in the
explanatory variables. Additionally in these regressions the coefficient on designated player wage
bill was not consistently positive or negative, indicating that the true effect of this variable on team
performance cannot truly be observed under these circumstances. These results were similar when
the DP wage bill was also used in place of the number of designated players. Overall there were
no changes to the results when this variable was included in the analysis.
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The results of these regressions are available in Tables K, L, M and N in the Appendix.
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When the designated player wage bill was included in the regressions where attendance
was used as the dependent variable the results mimicked those presented earlier. Points, lag points,
and wage inequality remained statistically significant and the number of designated players
produced a significant and negative coefficient in one of the regressions. The wage bill of the
designated players was significant in two of the cases, though there is not strong economic
significance in these situations – it would take an additional $1 million spent on designated player
wages in order to bring an additional 250 fans on average to a game. The coefficient on designated
player wage bill was also not constantly either positive or negative, a characteristic which indicates
that the true impact of this variable cannot be accurately measured.
The variation made in the regression with revenue as the dependent variable was the
creation of three addition binary variables reflecting the presence of a first, second, and third
designated player on a roster.27 This was developed in order to observe the independent effects of
each of the players on the revenue of a MLS franchise. These binary variables allowed for the
number of designated players on a roster to have a stepwise effect on revenue rather than each
being considered to have the same impact of team revenue. When these variable were included
attendance remained statistically significant at the 99% level but none of these additional variables
were significant in the regression. This indicates that there is no specific player that is significant
in adding to a team’s revenue through out a season – it is not the first or the second or third that
makes a difference in the long run for franchise revenue.
A third regression was run to observe the interactive effects between designated players
and the individual teams. In this regression the explanatory variables included were average
seasonal attendance, the number of designated players, the number of designated players squared,

27

The results of this regression are presented in Table O found in the Appendix.

30

the interaction between designated players and team, the team fixed effects, and the year time
effects.28 Under this regression twelve of the nineteen MLS teams produced significant interactive
effects with the number of designated players on their roster. The coefficients were all positive
and ranged from 10.568 to 36.401. This indicates that designated players at these teams have a
positive impact on team revenue bringing more money for each additional designated player that
they sign to their roster. This is not the case for every franchise in the MLS; all nineteen interactive
effects do not result in significant coefficients. This further examination of the relationship
between designated players and revenue suggests that their presence might positively impact some
of the teams in the league, but overall does not change the ultimate findings of this paper.

Conclusion
It is undeniable that the best known and most respected teams are those that are both high
profiting and high performing. It makes sense that a team’s objective would be success in both of
those categories and their objective function would be based upon those two factors. The
Designated Player Rule in the MLS was created as a method through which teams could hopefully
improve upon both revenue and performance. The teams are able to promote international players
and raise the expectations of fans. But on the other hand, designated players are an expensive
investment. The clubs spend millions on these few players, hoping that their presence will have
positive effects.
The results of this paper introduce the idea that designated players do not positively affect
either performance or attendance, and through those means do not affect revenue in a positive
manner. The objective function is based upon these two factors, profit and performance. Both of
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The results of this regression are available in Table P in the Appendix.
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which are influenced by a player’s marginal factor cost, marginal revenue product, and marginal
points. The first, the salary of a player, is given based on the skill and reputation of a player. The
latter two are what must be weighed against the first in order to determine the value of signing a
player. The results show that the marginal points are not consistent with the cost of a player.
Designated players cannot be used as a means by which to improve performance. The results do
show that designated players have an external influence on revenue, outside of performance and
attendance. In order for the signing of a designated player to be justified it must be established
that this marginal revenue produce from the outside sources is greater than the cost. There needs
to be a way that these players bring money into the team to offset the cost of their high salaries
because they are not doing so through playing success or increased attendance.
When Grant Wahl documented David Beckham’s time with the LA Galaxy in his book The
Beckham Experiment, he discovered similar results. The book highlights Beckham’s first two
seasons with Galaxy, 2007 and 2008. During this period of time he spent more of his time injured
on the bench playing limited minutes than turning Galaxy into a soccer dynasty. Wahl establishes
that overall Beckham had little impact on the playing success of the team. His only positive impact
came through increased attendance from those hoping to see the legendary midfielder play and
merchandise sales, both of which decreased over time as Beckham continued to sit on the sidelines
and the shine was lost from his being a Galaxy player.
It can be seen through both the results of this paper and Wahl’s account of “The Beckham
Experiment” the dual team objectives of performance and revenue are not evenly affected, if at all,
by the presence of designated players. This opens up the debate for what positive effects they
bring to teams and the league. If it is the hope of Major League Soccer to grow and expand, then
it needs to be determined how to use these players as a positive influence for both the league and
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the teams moving forwards. The investment into a designated player is a substantial amount and
the returns on these players need to be reflective of this investment.
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Appendix
Table A: Designated Player Rule and Major League Salary Cap by Year29
Year

Salary Cap

Cost of First DP

Cost of Second
DP

Cost of Third
DP

2004

1.9 million30

N/A

N/A

N/A

2005

1.9 million

N/A

N/A

N/A

2006

2.0 million

N/A

N/A

N/A

2007

2.1 million

$400,000

$325,000

N/A

2008

2.3 million

$400,000

$325,000

N/A

2009

2.3 million

$415,000

$335,000

N/A

2010

2.6 million

$335,000

$335,000

$335,000 +
$250,000 tax31

2011

2.7 million

$335,000

$335,000

$335,000 +
$250,000 tax

2012

2.8 million

$350,000

$350,000

$350,000 +
$250,000 tax

2013

2.9 million

$368,750

$368,750

$368,750 +
$250,000 tax

2014

3.5 million

$387,500

$387,500

$387,500 +
$250,000 tax

Most of the information included in this tabled comes from a similar table included in Coates, Frick, and Jewell’s
Superstar Salaries and Soccer Success.
29

30

The salary cap for 2004 is assumed to be similar to that of 2005 due to the lack of information on the subject.

31

The tax placed on the third Designated Player was an amendment to the rule in 2010. This eliminated the option to
trade Designated Player spots but allowed teams the third position if they were willing to pay the additional fee.
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Table B: Correlations: Wage Bill, Number of DPs, Salary Standard Deviation, Wage GINI
Wage Bill

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

167

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.613**
.000
167

Salary
Standard
Deviation

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.899**

Wage
GINI

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Wage Bill

Number
of DPs

**

Number of
DPs
1

Salary
Standard
Deviation

Wage GINI

.613**
.000
167

.899**
.000
167

.679**
.000
167

1

.510**
.000
167

.431**
.000
167

167

.000
167

.510**
.000
167

167

.679**
.000
167

.431**
.000
167

.842**
.000
167

Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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1

.842**
.000
167
1
167

Table C: Number of Designated Players on Each MLS Team (2007-2014)32
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Chicago Fire

1

1

1

2

0

1

2

1

Chivas USA

0

0

0

0

1

1

2

3

Colorado
Rapids

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

Columbus
Crew

0

1

1

1

1

0

3

1

DC United

0

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

FC Dallas

1

0

0

1

1

1

3

3

Houston
Dynamo

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

3

LA Galaxy

1

1

1

2

3

3

3

3

1

2

3

Montreal
Impact
New
England
Revolution

0

0

0

0

1

2

1

1

New York
Red Bulls

2

2

1

1

3

3

2

2

0

0

1

1

2

1

2

2

2

Philadelphia
Union
Portland
Timbers
Real Salt
Lake

0

San Jose
Earthquakes

0

0

0

1

2

2

3

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

3

2

2

3

3

Seattle
Sounders FC
Sporting
Kansas City

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

3

Toronto FC

0

0

1

2

3

3

2

3

2

3

1

3

Vancouver
Whitecaps
32

Table F begins with 2007 because that is the first year the Designated Player Rule was in effect.
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Table D: Forbes Revenue Data Summary Statistics
Statistic

Number of
Observations

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Team
Revenue
(Revit)

50

22.224

21

10.645

5

50

Team
Revenue
2007

13

12.769

10

7.886

5

36

Team
Revenue
2012

19

25.484

23

9.625

15

48

Team
Revenue
2014

18

25.611

23.5

9.605

13

50
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Table E: MLS Club Active Years
MLS Club

Active Years

Chicago Fire

2004 – 2014

Chivas USA

2005 – 2014

Colorado Rapids

2004 – 2014

Columbus Crew

2004 – 2014

DC United

2004 – 2014

FC Dallas

2004 – 2014

Houston Dynamo

2006 – 2014

Los Angeles Galaxy

2004 – 2014

Montreal Impact

2012 – 2014

New England Revolution

2004 – 2014

New York Red Bulls

2004 – 2014

Philadelphia Union

2010 – 2014

Portland Timbers

2011 – 2014

Real Salt Lake

2005 – 2014

San Jose Earthquakes

2004-2005, 2008 – 2014

Seattle Sounders FC

2009 – 2014

Sporting Kansas City

2004 – 2014

Toronto FC

2007 – 2014

Vancouver Whitecaps

2011 - 2014
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Table F: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic

Number of
Observations

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Total
Number of
Designated
Players
Rostered
(DPit)

167

1.006

1

1.067

0

3

Total
Number of
Points (Ptsit)

167

43.545

43

10.228

16

67

(Ptsi,t-1)

157

43.045

43

9.982

16

67

Total
Guaranteed
Player
Salaries
(WBit)

167

$3,891,272

$2,983,033

$2,945,282

$847,715

$16, 712, 603

167

$242,506

$104,909

$338,176

$32,557

$1,611,533

167

0.45286

0.41247

0.13543

0.29319

0.80390

167

17,239

16,638

5,589

7,063

44,038

Founding
Year (FYit)

167

0.0599

0

0.238

0

1

Year (t)

11

2009

2009

2004

2014

Lag Number
of Points

Team Std.
Dev. on
Salaries
(StdSit)
GINI
Coefficient
on Player
Salaries
(GINIit)
Average
Seasonal
Attendance
(Attit)
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Table G: Regression Results – Performance
Variable

Points as Dependent Variable

R2

0.315

0.377

0.333

0.385

0.331

0.383

Adjusted R2

0.163

0.233

0.179

0.238

0.177

0.236

Total Number
of Designated
Players
Rostered (DPit)

-0.936

-1.931ϯ

-1.298

-1.688

-1.024

-1.417

(-0.776)

(-1.618)

(-1.051)

(-1.412)

(-0.785)

(-1.122)

0.001***

0.002***

0.002***

0.002***

0.002***

(3.663)

(2.867)

(3.048)

(3.394)

(3.591)

-13.022

-13.032

(-1.126)

(-1.169)

Total
Guaranteed
Player Salaries
(WBit)
[per $1000]

GINI
Coefficient on
Player Salaries
(GINIit)
Team Std.
Dev. on
Salaries (StdSit)
Founding Year
(FYit)

-0.009

-0.009ϯ

(-1.280)

(-1.359)

-10.795***

-11.119***

-11.161***

-11.120***

(-3.120)

(-3.356)

(-3.379)

(-3.361)

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2004 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group
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Table H: Regression Results - Attendance
Variable
2

Attendance as Dependent Variable
0.893

0.894

0.901

0.903

Adjusted R2

0.867

0.867

0.874

0.877

Total Number of
Designated Players
Rostered (DPit)

-0.204

-0.270

-0.381

-0.569**

(-0.757)

(-0.972)

(-1.398)

(-2.015)

Total Number of
Points (Ptsit)

0.078***

0.072***

0.077***

0.080***

(3.983)

(3.434)

(2.794)

(3.948)

Lag Number of
Points (Ptsi,t-1)

0.040**

0.041**

0.046**

0.031ϯ

(2.056)

(2.100)

(2.396)

(1.609)

0.00008961

-0.000332*

-0.000148

(0.983)

(-1.950)

(-1.299)

R

Total Guaranteed
Player Salaries
(WBit)
[per $1000]

8.349***

GINI Coefficient
on Player Salaries
(GINIit)

(3.291)

0.004***

Team Std. Dev. on
Salaries (StdSit)

(2.901)

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2004 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group
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Table I: Regression Results - Revenue
Variable
R

2

Adjusted R2

Revenue as Dependent Variable
0.955

0.958

0.921

0.923
0.992ϯ
(1.393)

Total Number of
Designated Players
Rostered (DPit)
Average Seasonal
Attendance (Attit)

0.979***
(3.719)

1.005***
(3.881)

[per 1000 people]

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2004 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group
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Table J: Robustness Summary Statistics
Statistic

Number of
Observations

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

13333

$1,864,220.25

$650,000

$3,116,680.50

$0

$13,885,000.00

A First
Designated
Player
(DP1it)

167

0.56

1

0.498

0

1

A Second
Designated
Player
(DP2it)

167

0.26

0

0.442

0

1

A Third
Designated
Player
(DP3it)

167

0.13

0

0.339

0

1

Wage Bill
of
Designated
Players
(WBDPit)

33

These statistics were only taken over the years 2007-2014 after the implementation of the Designated Player Rule.
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Table K: Robustness Regression Results – Performance
Variable

Points as Dependent Variable

R2

0.386

0.384

0.355

0.380

0.332

0.333

Adjusted R2

0.233

0.231

0.207

0.233

0.172

0.174

Total Number
of Designated
Players Rostered
(DPit)

-1.825
(-1.445)

-1.319
(-1.028)

-2.119*
(-1.705)

-1.590
(-1.279)

-0.931
(-0.702)

-1.437
(-1.101)

Wage Bill of
Designated
Players
(WBDPit)

0.001
(0.348)

-0.000498
(-0.477)

0.001***
(2.903)

-0.001
(-0.920)

-0.000466
(-0.430)

0.001
(0.340)

0.002**
(2.242)

0.02**
(2.305)

0.002**
(2.354)

0.002**
(2.161)

0.002**
(2.101)

[per $1000]

Total
Guaranteed
Player Salaries
(WBit)
[per $1000]

-10.590
(-0.861)

GINI
Coefficient on
Player Salaries
(GINIit)
Team Std. Dev.
on Salaries
(StdSit)

-0.00001202
(-1.053)

Founding Year
(FYit)

-11.159***
(-3.368)

-10.736
(-0.842)

-0.0000119
(-1.001)

-11.135***
(-3.356)

-10.999***
(-3.264)

-11.145***
(-3.362)

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2004 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group
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Table L: Robustness Regression Results – Performance (cont.)
Variable

Points as Dependent Variable

R2

0.376

0.379

0.341

0.373

0.329

0.327

Adjusted R2

0.227

0.231

0.196

0.229

0.175

0.173

Wage Bill of
Designated
Players
(WBDPit)

-0.000173
(-0.108)

-0.001
(-0.651)

0.001**
(2.464)

-0.001
(-1.361)

-0.001
(-0.553)

-0.000010
(-0.006)

0.002**
(2.561)

0.002**
(2.506)

0.002**
(2.622)

0.002**
(2.313)

0.002**
(2.362)

[per $1000]

Total
Guaranteed
Player Salaries
(WBit)
[per $1000]

GINI
Coefficient on
Player Salaries
(GINIit)

-13.684
(-1.148)

Team Std. Dev.
on Salaries
(StdSit)

-0.000009
(-0.806)

Founding Year
(FYit)

-10.722***
(-2.236)

-12.936
(-1.048)

-0.0000095
(-0.818)

-10.827***
(-3.276)

-10.441***
(-3.092)

-10.755***
(-3.250)

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2004 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group
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Table H: Robustness Regression Results - Attendance
Variable
2

Attendance as Dependent Variable
0.896

0.897

0.902

0.903

0.869

0.869

0.875

0.876

-0.358
(-1.262)

-0.409
(-1.426)

-0.288
(-1.011)

-0.587**
(-2.049)

0.000151ϯ
(1.627)

0.000375*
(1.723)

-0.000414
(-1.104)

0.000098
(0.418)

Total Number of
Points (Ptsit)

0.070***
(3.420)

0.075***
(3.587)

0.077***
(3.795)

0.080***
(3.946)

Lag Number of
Points (Ptsi,t-1)

0.042**
(2.145)

0.042**
(2.138)

0.048**
(2.494)

0.032ϯ
(1.635)

-0.000242
(-1.138)

-0.000198
(-0.945)

-0.000220
(-1.060)

R

Adjusted R2
Total Number of
Designated Players
Rostered (DPit)
Wage Bill of
Designated Players
(WBDPit)
[per $1000]

Total Guaranteed
Player Salaries
(WBit)
[per $1000]

7.851***
(2.793)

GINI Coefficient
on Player Salaries
(GINIit)
0.000007**
(2.559)

Team Std. Dev. on
Salaries (StdSit)

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2004 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group

46

Table N: Robustness Regression Results – Attendance (cont.)
Variable
2

Attendance as Dependent Variable
0.894

0.895

0.901

0.900

0.896

0.868

0.875

0.873

0.000112
(1.276)

0.000288ϯ
(1.371)

-0.001
(-1.468)

0.000024
(0.100)

Total Number of
Points (Ptsit)

0.073***
(3.650)

0.078***
(3.762)

0.080***
(3.948)

0.084***
(4.094)

Lag Number of
Points (Ptsi,t-1)

0.038**
(1.980)

0.038*
(1.950)

0.046**
(2.393)

0.028 ϯ
(1.433)

-0.000195
(-0.923)

-0.000162
(-0.786)

-0.000159
(-0.763)

R

Adjusted R2
Wage Bill of
Designated Players
(WBDPit)
[per $1000]

Total Guaranteed
Player Salaries
(WBit)
[per $1000]

6.571**
(2.367)

GINI Coefficient
on Player Salaries
(GINIit)
0.0000069***
(2.766)

Team Std. Dev. on
Salaries (StdSit)

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2004 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group
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Table O: Robustness Regression Results - Revenue
Variable
R

Revenue as Dependent Variable

2

0.959

Adjusted R2

0.919

A First Designated Player (DP1it)

0.260
(0.164)

A Second Designated Player (DP2it)

0.667
(0.332)

A Third Designated Player (DP3it)

1.779
(0.838)
0.999***
(2.737)

Average Seasonal Attendance (Attit)
[per 1000 people]

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2004 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group
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Table P: Robustness Regression Results – Revenue (cont.)
Variable

Revenue as Dependent Variable
R

2

0.981

Adjusted R2
Total Number of
Designated Players
Rostered Squared
(DPit)2
Average Seasonal
Attendance (Attit)

-3.072**
(-2.081)

0.833**
(2.231)

0.922

Montreal Impact &
DPs

13.142*
(2.097)

NY Red Bulls & DPs

20.920**
(2.514)

Philadelphia Union &
DPs

14.615**
(2.533)

Portland Timbers &
DPs

27.559***
(3.156)

[per 1000 people]

Chicago Fire & DPs

36.401**
(2.679)

Seattle Sounders &
DPs

18.317**
(2.235)

Dallas FC & DPs

12.039*
(1.952)

Sporting KC & DPs

12.476**
(2.716)

Houston Dynamo &
DPs

8.948*
(1.951)

Toronto FC & DPs

10.568**
(2.254)

LA Galaxy & DPs

11.942*
(1.876)

Vancouver
Whitecaps & DPs

18.666**
(2.310)

*** indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level
ϯ

indicated significance at the 90% level when considered under a one-tailed test

The t-statistics for each coefficient are included in parenthesis beneath the value of each coefficient.
Not included are the binary variables representative of year and team characteristics
Excluded from the Fixed Effects regressions are the data from 2014 and Chicago Fire as the comparison group
The only interaction effects that are presented in this table are those that were statistically significant in the results.

49

References
Badenhausen, Kurt and Peter Schwartz. “Major League Soccer’s Most Valuable Teams.”
Available from http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/09/mls-soccer-beckham-biz-sportscz_kb_0909mlsvalues.html. Internet.
Berri, David J., Martin B. Schmidt, and Stacey L. Brook. 2004. “Stars at the gate: The Impact of
Star Power on NBA Gate Revenues.” Journal of Sports Economics 5(1): 33–50.
February.
Coates, Dennis, Bernd Frick, and Todd Jewell. 2014. “Superstar Salaries and Soccer Success:
The Impact of Designated Players in Major League Soccer.” Journal of Sports
Economics 1–20.
Fey, Bruno S., Markus Schaffner, Sascha L. Schmidt and Benno Torgler. 2013. “Do Employees
Care About Their Relative Income Position? Behavioral Evidence Focusing on
Performance in Profession Team Sports.” Social Science Quarterly 94(4): 921–932.
December.
Garcia-del-Bario, Pedro and Francesc Pujol. 2007. “Hidden Monopsony Rents in Winner-takeall Markets – Sport and Economic Contribution of Spanish Soccer Players.” Manaerial
and Decision Economics 28: 57-70.
Houston Dynamo. “Standings.” Available from
http://www.houstondynamo.com/standings/mls/2004/. Internet.
Jane, Wen-Jhan. 2014. “The Effect of Star Quality on Attendance Demand: the Case of the
National Basketball Association.” Journal of Sports Economics 1–22.
Jewell, R. Todd. 2015. “The Effects of Marquee Players on Sports Demand: The Case of U.S.
Major League Soccer.” Journal of Sports Economics 1–14.
Keuthe, Todd H. and Mesbah Motamed. 2010. “Returns to Stardom: Evidence From U.S. Major
League Soccer.” Journal of Sports Economics 11(5): 567–579.
Lawson, Robert A, Kathleen Sheehan, and E. Frank Stephenson. 2008. “Vend It Like Beckham:
David Beckham’s Effect on MLS Ticket Sales.” International Journal of Sports Finance
3: 189–195.
Mayers, Joshua. Sounders FC Blog. “A quick look at Sounder FC’s history with designated
players.” 2013. The Seattle Times. November 19. Available from
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/soundersfc/2013/11/19/a-look-at-sounders-fcs-history-withdesignated-players/. Internet.
MLS Players Union. “Player Salary Information.” Available from
https://www.mlsplayers.org/salary_info.html. Internet.
50

MLS Press Box. “Designated Players.” Available from
http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/content/designated-players#overlaycontext=content/media-resources. Internet.
MLS Press Box. “Roster Rules and Regulations.” Available from
http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/content/roster-rules-and-regulations. Internet.
MLS. “Designated Players in MLS: Every club has a DP for the first time in league history.”
2013. Available from http://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2013/08/16/designated-playersmls-every-club-has-dp-first-time-league-history. Internet.
Sloane, Peter J. 1971. “The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as a Utility
Maximiser.” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 121-146. June.
Smith, Chris. “Major League Soccer’s Most Valuable Teams 2015”. Available from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2015/08/19/major-league-soccers-most-valuableteams-2015-2/2/. Internet.
Smith, Chris. “Major League Soccer’s Most Valuable Teams.” Available from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/11/20/major-league-soccers-most-valuableteams/. Internet.
Sonntag, Schooner J. and Paul M. Soomers. 2014. “Work Incentives and Salary Distributions in
Major League Soccer.” International Atlantic Economic Society 471–472. October 15.
Thornton, Tweed. “DP is the Answer; Fire May Not Know How to Wield the Tool.” 2013. SB
Nation. August 6. Available from
http://www.hottimeinoldtown.com/2013/8/6/4590380/dp-is-the-answer-fire-may-notknow-how-to-wield-the-tool. Internet.
Wahl, Grant. The Beckham Experiment: How the World’s Most Famous Athlete Tried to
Conquer America. New York: Crown, 2009. Print.
Zimbalist, Andrew. 2010. “Reflections on Salary Shares and Salary Caps.” Journal of Sports
Economics 11: 17–28.

51

